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ABSTRACT
There has been a proliferation of research on Africa’s borderlands
over the past decade, which reﬂects their centrality in regional
systems of trade and the rapid growth of border settlements. The
development of twin towns/cities at the border, which has
attracted the interest of scholars in other regions of the world, has
been a distinctive feature of Africa as well. This paper examines
some of the particularities of peripheral urbanism in Africa, whilst
seeking to avoid a resort to continental exceptionalism. It begins
by tracing some broad patterns before homing in on two sets of
case-studies along the Uganda/Kenya and Ghana/Togo borders.
The paper argues, ﬁrstly, for the enduring importance of colonial
infrastructural investments and the policy choices that were made
after independence. Secondly, it highlights the markedly different
variations of scale, ranging from the border capitals of Kinshasa
and Brazzaville at one end of the spectrum, through growing
towns like Busia-Uganda and Busia- Kenya, to a multiplicity of
smaller border settlements at the other end. Thirdly, the paper
argues that administrative logics and trade dynamics have been
the main drivers in the expansion of twin cities/towns, although
the ﬂight of populations from insecurity have also played a
signiﬁcant role in the Great Lakes region and in West-Central
Africa. Finally, the paper points to a feature that has been
identiﬁed in other regions as well, notably the often marked
asymmetries between border settlements, which reﬂects the
inﬂuence of deeper historical trajectories and contemporary
patterns of trade and population movement alike.
Introduction
The past decade has witnessed a veritable explosion of writing about African borderlands
after a long period in which the subject was distinctly unfashionable. As this literature has
proliferated across the various disciplines, it has also become more diverse, including
detailed studies of trade networks (Walther 2008; Scheele 2012; Titeca 2012; Walther
2014b), migratory ﬂows (Cross 2013; Streiff-Fenart 2013; Adeniran 2014), bureaucracy
and “practical norms” (Chalﬁn 2010; Titeca and De Herdt 2010), border (in)security
and neo-secessionist movements (Engelbert 2009; Tomas and Zeller forthcoming). An
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interest in border towns has been part of this new wave of research, and in many ways it
has fed off each of the emergent strands (Dobler 2009a; Zeller 2009). Whether the objects
of study are moving through border spaces or are located at the physical boundary, the
towns themselves occupy an important position. Border cities and towns are, however,
typiﬁed by profound ambiguities. They are often associated with acute poverty and des-
peration where those without alternatives frequently wash up—a feature that is thrown
into sharper relief when the city also happens to be a national or regional capital
(Raeymaekers 2014). But at the same time, they occupy strategic positions within regional
trading systems, which means that private fortunes and public reputations alike are made
there. And where there is a bustling border town, the chances are that there is a twin
close-by. The twinning metaphor is not one that ﬁnds universal favor, and Jan Buursink
has canvassed some possible alternatives—such as companion, neighboring and transbor-
der cities (Buursink 2001, 15–7). With regard to Africa, and arguably elsewhere as well, the
alternatives are not necessarily a great improvement or they obscure the fundamental
point that these conurbations share a high degree of inter-relatedness based on kinship
as well as common economic ties. In Africa, there is almost no twinning at the institutional
level, and municipal and district authorities are actively discouraged from communicating
directly with one another: it almost all happens “from below.”1 In real life, twins do not
always look so similar despite the fact that they share the circumstances of their con-
ception—and much the same could be said of border towns in Africa where the siblings
in question assume different shapes and sizes. But the crucial point is that they generally
bear the hallmarks of their inter-relatedness.
Twin cities/towns cannot be considered as an inevitable by-product of the existence of
international borders. It is just as often the case that borders run through physical wild-
erness where very few people live—which may be a consideration in the positioning of
the border in the ﬁrst place—or settlements may have their backs turned towards one
another. To talk of twin cities/towns, therefore, implies not merely that urban settlements
exist side by side, but also that they feed off one another in an active sense (Buursink 2001)
—whether that be through the circulation of goods, the movement of people or the
exchange of ideas and cultural practices. The twin city phenomenon is perhaps most fam-
iliar from the United States/Mexico interface where substantial conurbations have
emerged along the length of the border (Nugent 2012, 557–71). In Africa, there are
instances of border towns existing on one side only, but where towns do face each
across the line they have generally not had their backs turned to one another, but have
emerged out of mutually-embedded relationships. This partly reﬂects the limitations of
state initiatives to manage space and partly the skill with which populations have
woven their livelihood strategies around the existence of borders.
In Africa, there is a much wider spectrum of cases than along the United States/Mexico
border. There are only a handful of true twin-cities, but there are examples of cities that
have a much smaller sibling on the other side. And there are many more examples of twin
towns, of more modest proportions, that have developed in an intimate relationship with
one another. In the majority of cases, we are talking of “duplicated” rather than “parti-
tioned” cities/towns (Buursink 2001, 7–8), although this is often complicated by the fact
that settlements have themselves relocated after the creation of a border—typically from
one river bank to the next—creating an illusion of partition. One point that emerges
strongly from recent research is that size can be a misleading indicator of signiﬁcance.
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Smaller urban settlements are often remarkably well-networked and often derive their
considerable dynamism from linking the local and the regional to the global (Dobler
2009b). In this article, therefore, we want to cover the broad spectrum of peripheral urban-
ism, but with a particular focus on settlements that face each across an international
border and whose fates have been intertwined in various ways. In the ﬁrst section, we
identify some of the factors that have been instrumental in shaping the twin-town
phenomenon in Africa. In order to deepen the analysis, we then proceed to consider
two sets of regional examples in greater detail. The ﬁrst is drawn from East Africa,
taking the two Busias, Malabas and Lwakhkhas on the Uganda/Kenya border. The
second concerns West Africa with a particular focus on Lomé in Togo and Aﬂao in
Ghana alongside a number of smaller towns.
The Conﬁguration of Twin Towns and Cities in Africa
Across Africa, there are quite distinct variants of the twin town/city phenomenon (see
Table 1). West-Central Africa provides the only example in the world of two capital
cities that face onto each other. Kinshasa, capital of the Democratic Republic of Congo
(DRC) and Brazzaville, capital of the Republic of Congo, together constitute a vast
urban complex of some 13 million people, which makes it signiﬁcantly larger than
Greater London or Paris. There are also ﬁve other cases where a capital city is located
on an international border: namely Lomé (Togo), Bangui (Central African Republic),
N’djaména (Chad), Maseru (Lesotho) and Gaborone (Botswana). In the case of Gaborone,
Table 1. Variants on Twin Cities and Towns in Africa Today
Type Twins
Population 1990 (or other
year) Population 2014 (or other year)
Capital to
Capital
Kinshasa (DRC) & Brazzaville
(Rep. of Congo)
Kinshasa 3.7 mn
Brazzaville 0.7 mn
Kinshasa 11.1 mn
Brazzaville 1.8 mn
Capital to Town 1. Lomé (Togo) & Aﬂao
(Ghana)
2. Bangui (CAR) & Zongo
(DRC)
3. N’djaména (Chad) &
Kousseri
1. Lomé 450,000, Aﬂao
20,904 (1984)
2. Bangui, 427,435 (1988),
Zongo (unknown)
3. N’djaména 500,000,
Kousseri 53,713 (1987)
1. Lomé 1,449,284 (2010) Aﬂao
50,699 (2010)
2. Bangui 622,771 (2003) & Zongo
32,516 (2012)
3. N’djaména 1.2 mn Kousseri
89,123(2005)
City to City
(examples
only)
1. Goma (DRC) & Gisenyi
(Rwanda)
2. Bukavu (DRC) &
Cyangugu (Rwanda)
1. Goma 109,904, (1994),
Gisenyi 22,156 (1991)
2. Bukavu, 201,569 (1994),
Cyangugu 9,693 (1991)
1. Goma 1mn (est.) Gisenyi 126,706
(2012)
2. Bukavu (est.) 832,000 Cyangugu
27,416 (2012)
Town to Town
(examples
only)
1. Busia-Uganda & Busia-Kenya
2. Malaba-Uganda
& Malaba-Kenya 3. Katima
Mulilo (Namibia) & Sesheke
(Zambia)
4. Malanville (Benin) & Gaya
(Niger)
1. Busia-Uganda 27,967
(1991) Busia-Kenya 20,781
(1989)
2. Malaba-Uganda 7,577
(2002) Malaba-Kenya 7,302
(1999)
3. Katima Mulilo 13,377
(1991) Sesheke 5,390
4. Malanville 21,185 Gaya
14,868 (1988)
1. Busia-Uganda: 55,958 Busia-
Kenya: 40,740 (2009)
2. Malaba-Uganda: 18,244 (2009)
Malaba-Kenya: 16,480 (2009)
3. Katima Mulilo 28,200 (2011)
Sesheke (pop unknown: district
total 94,612 in 2010)
4. Malanville 43,939 (2010) Gaya
37,988 (2010)
Source: Figures for West Africa is based on the re-calculated ﬁgures of OECD, Africapolis/SWAC-OECD 2014. See http://stats.
oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=SAH_URBA_LATLON_V3%20
We are grateful for permission to use these. The other ﬁgures are derived from two main data sets: http://www.geohive.
com and http://www.citypopulation.de/. These have cross-referenced against http://esa.un.org/unpd/wup/wallcharts/
WUP_2014%20Urban%20Agglomerations%20Wallchart.pdf; http://www.stat-togo.org/contenu/pdf/rgph4-tg-vol1-tab2.
1.pdf; and http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/sources/census/2010_phc/Zambia/PreliminaryReport.pdf
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the issue of twin towns does not arise because the South African side of the border is essen-
tially devoid of population. But in each of the other cases, there are towns of some size
located across the line, whose existence owes something to the more substantial neighbor.
Hence, the market at Kousseri (Cameroun) has provisioned N’djaména on the opposite
bank of the Chari river. There is a similar relationship between Zongo (DRC) and
Bangui that face each other across the Congo River (Bennaﬂa 2002).2
Then there are many more cases where secondary cities, which may also be regional
capitals, meet at an international border, such as Goma and Gisenyi in the DRC and
Rwanda respectively. And ﬁnally, there are countless instances of border towns of a
more modest size that are located on either side of the international border. The dynamism
of medium-sized border towns emerges very clearly from Bennaﬂa’s detailed study of trade
along Cameroun’s borders—especially in the north where such towns were consolidated
through a system of rotating markets specializing in different commodities (Bennaﬂa
2002). In some cases, as we will see in the second part of this article, twin towns share
the same name—such as Busia-Uganda and Busia-Kenya, Moyale-Ethiopia and Moyale-
Kenya or Kerawa-Cameroun and Kerawa-Nigeria. This is a clear indication of a historic
connection between neighboring settlements that may have constituted a single settlement
before the border was drawn or have emerged as a response to its existence. But even where
towns might bear distinct names, or have changed their names, the bonds between one
town and the other are often extremely strong—typically based on notions of a shared
history, kinship and self-interest. In this article, we seek to account for the emergence of
twin towns in Africa and to expose some of their internal dynamics (Table 1).
The Making of Twin Cities and Twin Towns
Twin towns have a “pre-history” in Africa, but not in a manner that reveals particularly
deep continuities. In the West African Sahel, twin towns were typically located within
the boundaries of a single kingdom or empire, where the court of the ruler would be
separated—both physically and symbolically—from the town associated with the Muslim
traders, whose networks often extended across hundreds of miles (Loimeier 2013).
Where regimes sought to secure an unstable border through planned settlement, as in
the case of the walled towns on the southern margins of the Sokoto Caliphate, this was
based on the presumption that there was nothing—except raw heathenism—on the
other side. In Eastern Africa, towns and markets at the edge of the Great Lakes mediated
the commercial engagement between different political centers. But there was typically a
multiplicity of inter-related settlements rather than a straightforward dualism. Finally,
across the continent, river crossings provided a convenient point at which rulers could
regulate the movement of people and tax goods, but this did not of itself require much
Table 2. Arrivals and Departures Through Entebbe, Busia and Malaba, 1992–1994
Year
Arrivals from Kenya Departures to Kenya
Entebbe Busia Malaba Entebbe Busia Malaba
1992 61,726 59,899 36,994 61,109 65,556 39,557
1993 74,427 71,652 53,002 73,206 80,877 53,636
1994 102,838 78,074 61,898 97,896 92,814 59,033
Source: Uganda. Migration and Tourism Statistics (Busia, Entebbe and Malaba), 1995.
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of an administrative presence. Riverain populations, whether along the lower Congo or the
Zambezi, often enjoyed a close relationship with the people on the other bank, whilst
resisting control by competing political centers (Gongola 1996; McGregor 2009). But
stable urban conglomerations did not generally emerge. Before the colonial period, there-
fore, it is difﬁcult to think of precise equivalents of the contemporary twin-town phenom-
enon. It was the dynamics unleashed by the demarcation of colonial borders that brought
some of the potentialities of existing settlements into play.
(1) Colonial Legacies: Administrative, Fiscal and Commercial Logics
The reasons why particular twin cities/towns took shape where they did have everything to
do with colonial logics that were as much ﬁscal as administrative in nature. Other things
being equal, the choice of a colonial capital was based on convenience; the choice of port
cities, such as Mogadishu or Accra, as capitals hinged on their existing infrastructure and
connectivity. This also meant that they did not necessarily stand in any geographical
proximity to the borders that were deﬁned at the close of the 19th century and properly
demarcated in the 20th. Bathurst (Banjul) was a singular case because by controlling the
mouth, as well as both banks, of the Gambia River, the British aimed to obviate the possi-
bility of a rival emerging. Lomé was distinctive for a different reason, namely that it was
not located on a river and was not previously a port of any signiﬁcance.
When it comes to Africa’s inland river systems, colonial logics were rather more con-
ducive to the emergence of the twin city/town. Colonial regimes had a penchant for locat-
ing capitals along rivers, because they were more readily accessible by boat before the
advent of the railway and all-weather roads. As it happened, they also found rivers to
be a convenient instrument for partitioning territory.
The combined effect was that a number of Africa’s colonial capitals were located along
rivers that also constituted the international border. Such was the case with Bangui, N’dja-
ména, and Maseru. In these instances, what was located on the other side of the river was
not another city, but a rather peripheral region without any great demographic weight.3
The exception was where river settlements represented nodes within a system of regional
markets, as was the case along stretches of the Congo River. In these instances, the creation
of an administrative center on one side of the border would often stimulate the demand for
goods in markets on the opposite bank. The one example of genuine twin cities is provided
by Léopoldville (Kinshasa) and Brazzaville, which provided the capitals for the Belgian and
French Congo, respectively. The decision by the Belgians and the French to locate their
capitals opposite each other arose from the simple geographical reality that the Congo
River afforded the optimal means of transportation for both colonial powers. The
chosen location was at the point where the river became navigable—that is above the
falls. The river was relatively narrow at this point, although wide enough for the two
regimes to maintain a safe distance, while the existence of the Malebo Pool made the
waters there much less turbulent. The twin capitals were created according to administra-
tive convenience, but they developed on the basis of an intimate relationship between
populations on the two sides. This, in turn, drew on older networks of trade. Before the
Second World War, Kinshasa was fed by produce coming from the other bank, while con-
sumer goods were traded in the opposite direction. Much of the population in the two
cities made a living from the transportation and sale of goods from one side to the
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other, a trade that ebbed and ﬂowed according to the vagaries of supply, pricing and cur-
rency differentials. There is also an abundant body of literature which points to the close
cultural ties between the two cities, most notably in respect to sport, music and religious
observance (Martin 1995; Gongola 1996). Congolese music, properly called, was actually a
co-production of musicians and entrepreneurs from the twin cities and came to be enjoyed
in both locations (Stewart 2000). It is impossible, therefore, to understand the dynamics of
either city without recognizing a profound embeddedness in the cultural and economic life
of the other.
Aside from the siting of capital cities, colonialism was also conducive to the creation of
secondary towns that were located along borders. Early colonial states sought to balance the
books by controlling key choke-points along internal trade routes and then taxing the com-
modities that passed through. Even before the borders were properly demarcated, military
and administrative posts were established along lines that existed only on maps and in trea-
ties. Many of these subsequently developed into full-ﬂedged administrative centers. Where
competition between the Europeans was intense, there was often a tit-for-tat process of
creating administrative posts. This “mirroring” dynamic is apparent from the Great
Lakes region where ﬁerce competition between Belgium and Germany eventually culmi-
nated in the Hecq-Bethe agreement of 1899. Gillian Mathys observes that the need to
prove some form of “effective occupation” led to a competitive process of establishing colo-
nial posts along what became the Congo-Rwanda border. She writes that:
The Hecq-Bethe agreement explains why posts often mirrored each other and the
current spatial outlines of the Goma/Gisenyi and Bukavu/Cyangugu as twin cities.
When one post was established, the other colonizing power had to establish a post on
the other side of the border, with an equal military strength, in order to secure territorial
claims (Mathys 2014, 127–8).
Hence she notes that the Congo Free State’s establishment of Cyangugu was a direct
response to the German occupation of Shangi, while the creation of Goma in 1906 was a
riposte to the creation of a German post at Gisenyi the previous year. Once created,
these particular administrative posts evolved into substantial towns, whose relationship
was based on administrative imperatives as well as the need to channel labor and regulate
trade. The importance of Goma, in particular, derived largely from its role in directing
Rwandan labor to settler farms in Kivu (eastern DRC today). On the other hand Bukavu,
which was initially far larger than Goma, prospered by being selected as the capital of
Kivu District in the interwar period (Mathys 2014, 229). At the moment of independence,
the administrative logics scarcely altered. Capital cities located on borders grew apace, while
regional capitals continued to be regarded as important for anchoring state structures in the
borderlands. In a country as vast as the DRC, regional capitals necessarily developed
according to their own dynamic, sucking in population from the surrounding areas.
(2) Post-Colonial Developments: The Catalytic Role of Trade
During the colonial period, some of the impetus for the emergence of twin towns arose
from differential tax regimes. The resulting price differentials turned smuggling into a
proﬁtable pursuit. During the Second World War, the shortage of basic commodities,
which were typically more acute in the French colonies than in the British ones, also
played a role at a critical juncture. To some extent also, the movement of peoples back
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and forth across the line in order to avoid paying direct taxes contributed to the emergence
of safe havens within border zones. But it is above all in the post-colonial period that diver-
gent economic policies created the incentives to engage in cross-border trade, and thereby
generated the phenomenon of border towns that thrived on contraband.
There were several factors at work here. The ﬁrst was the collapse of a number of fed-
erations in the decade on either side of independence in the early 1960s, yielding a mul-
tiplicity of independent states pursuing essentially competitive economic policies.
Whereas the former French colonies in West Africa (with the exception of Guinea) and
in Equatorial Africa remained tied to France through adoption of the CFA franc, the
former British and Belgian colonies established their own central banks and independent
currencies. The latter became overvalued when governments responded to economic con-
straints by simply printing more banknotes. Amongst the most extreme instances were
those of Ghana in the 1970s and Zaire (now the DRC) under Mobutu. Secondly, the
larger states generally sought to build national industries from behind tariff walls, and
based on subsidies derived from a range of taxes on export crops, thereby necessitating
the creation of harder borders. For the micro-states that enjoyed access to the sea, indus-
trialization was not a realistic option, but the re-export of consumer goods certainly was.
This provided an incentive for traders to establish themselves in close proximity to the
borders, channeling contraband goods into neighboring territory and despatching cash
crops in the opposite direction (Golub 2012). The rulers of the micro-states along the
West African littoral—notably the Gambia, Benin and Togo—had no incentive to discou-
rage the contraband economy, which brought in Customs revenue and secured livelihoods
for much of the population. Hence there was a coincidence between popular livelihood
strategies based on cross-border trade and the ﬁscal interests of the states in question.
Thirdly, the OPEC oil price hikes led to an acute economic crisis in a number of
countries. Ironically, the countries that beneﬁted from the oil price hikes, most notably
Nigeria, opted to subsidize petrol prices for their own populations, which provided an
additional stimulus to engage in smuggling. The development of twin towns along the
Nigeria-Benin border was a manifestation of the second and the third dynamics at
work: that is relatively expensive Nigerian manufactured goods, by comparison with
those entered through the Beninois port of Cotonou, and subsidized petroleum prices
created the ideal conditions for the development of the contraband economy. The other
well-documented case is that of Zaire (DRC) under Mobutu where low producer prices
for cash crops (MacGaffey 1987, 113, Mukoya 1991),4 a worthless currency and consumer
shortages were accompanied by the decomposition of the national economy and the elab-
oration of dense networks of international exchange. Border towns developed a close
relationship with their counterparts in neighboring countries, and these were in turn
linked into a truly international trade in minerals and cash crops. Whereas the thinking
behind economic nationalism had envisaged development radiating outwards from the
capital, by the early 1980s Africa’s main cities were often in a decrepit state, whereas
urban centers closer to the border were often booming on the basis of their strategic
role in regional trading complexes. The era of Structural Adjustment removed some of
the economic rents that resulted from overvalued currencies and consumer shortages,
but it did not alter the underpinning logics of cross-border trade. Indeed, trade liberaliza-
tion often provided a spur to commerce in border regions, as Olivier Walther demon-
strates for the three towns of Malanville (Benin), Gaya (Niger) and Kamba (Nigeria)
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and the twin settlements of Birni N’Konni (Niger) and Illela (Nigeria) (Walther 2008,
2014, 188).5
More recently, African countries have come to embrace regional integration agendas
that seek to achieve a better integration into the global economy through large-scale
investments in infrastructure and tariff reductions. In the process, the trade across
borders has assumed new dimensions. Bridge crossings, railheads and trucking stops
are helping to give some established border towns a new lease of life, while leading to
the emergence of others. A good example of the transformative power of infrastructure
is on the border between Namibia and Zambia where the bridging of the Zambezi
River in 2004 has led to a substantial increase in trafﬁc from the Zambian Copperbelt
along the transport corridor to Walvis Bay, thereby creating a boom-town effect in
Katimo Mulilo (Namibia) and to a lesser extent in Sesheke (Zambia) on the opposite
side of the river (Zeller 2009). The picture is more mixed at the border between
Zambia and the DRC where the Copperbelt itself straddles the boundary. Chililabombwe,
which is set back from the border, is located at the northern railhead of the Zambian
railway. Its population is estimated to have risen from 48,055 in 1990 to 77,818 in
2010.6 An improved road leads from Chililabombwe to Lubumbashi, the largest city in
the southern DRC. Set hard against the border, on the DRC side, is Kasumbalesa whose
growth in recent years has derived from its position along a vital trade corridor that
handles around 500–600 trucks a day.7 The perennial delays at the border crossings,
here and elsewhere, have created opportunities for people selling services of various kinds.
Connective infrastructure has not merely been important for extractive industries and
for long-distance trucking of consumer goods, but equally so for more localized cross-
border trading networks. Some traders who specialize in sourcing cheaper goods from
China have set up well-stocked stores at the border. Hence, Gregor Dobler has shown
how the Namibian border town of Oshikango has experienced its own mini-boom
based on shoppers crossing through the Angolan border town of Namacunde to
acquire commodities more cheaply from Chinese stores (Dobler 2008). It matters that
taxes vary signiﬁcantly between one African country and the next. Hence, the Rwandan
state taxes petroleum signiﬁcantly more than its counterpart in the DRC, which creates
an incentive to spirit it across the border. In an article that compares petroleum trading
in Goma and Gisenyi, Hugh Lamarque observes that Goma has prospered from the sub-
stantial border trade more than Gisenyi. In Gisenyi, the sale of petroleum products is
heavily controlled (and taxed), whereas in Goma it is scarcely regulated by the state at
all. While Goma might be seen as disorderly by comparison with its Rwandan twin, it
is also seen as a place of more abundant opportunities (Lamarque 2014). The patterns
of uneven urban growth to some extent reﬂect this balance of advantages.
(3) Refugees and Displaced Peoples
In the decades immediately after independence, the ﬂow of migrants across borders, which
had been actively encouraged by colonial regimes, continued unabated. The relatively new
element was the ﬂight of populations from conditions of insecurity. This began with the
messy end to the Belgium empire in the Great Lakes region, continued with civil wars in
Nigeria and the Horn in the 1970s, and in more recent times has been compounded by
the Rwandan genocide and its knock-on effects in DRC—to mention only some of the
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most obvious cases. A common pattern is one in which people ﬂeeing conﬂict simply relo-
cate with kin on the other side of the border—as has happened repeatedly on the Senegal
(Casamance) border. A more common pattern is one in which refugees have been formally
registered with UNHCR and beenmoved into camps—as happened when refugees ﬂed from
Bangui to Zongo in 2001. Whereas camps are based on the logic of cordoning off the refugee
population, the ﬁrst pattern has been more conducive to the growth of permanent towns.
Conﬂicts also create internally-displaced persons who often move to urban centers in
search of greater security. This has been a major factor in the growth of towns along the
Rwanda/DRC border since the Rwandan genocide. Supporters of the ousted Rwandan
regime relocated to the Kivus in the DRC, thereby sparking a series of linked conﬂicts
between notional indigenes and Tutsi “strangers” in which the Rwandan army was directly
involved.8 In 2002, Goma is estimated to have had a population of 250,000 people, but at
the time of writing it is thought to have risen to no less than a million—the great surge
coming from people escaping the ﬁghting in rural North Kivu. Across the Rwandan
border, where conditions have been stable since the coming to power of the Rwandan
Patriotic Front (RPF) regime, Gisenyi is estimated to have a much smaller population
of 106,335.9 In the other pairing of Bukavu and Cyangugu, the relative order of magnitude
is very similar. Whereas Bukavu, the main city in South Kivu, is estimated to have a popu-
lation of 832,000, the population of Cyangugu across the border is estimated at only
63,000. The upheavals in South Kivu again account in large part for the surge in the
urban population in DRC. For the Rwandan authorities, who have been party to the con-
ﬂict, it has been important to contain the ﬁghting in DRC which might partially explain
why the demographic growth has been signiﬁcantly slower in Cyangugu and Gisenyi.
To brieﬂy summarize, there are a number of different dynamics that we have identiﬁed
in the sedimentation of border towns. These were rooted, ﬁrstly, in administrative-cum-
ﬁscal logics—whether arising from the need to ﬁnd the most convenient site for the
location of a colonial or regional capital or from the imperative to regulate the movement
of people and goods. Secondly, some border towns grew up around the opportunities for
trade that borders often presented, especially in the decades following independence when
the ﬁnancial returns from smuggling multiplied. Thirdly, some border towns acquired
their signiﬁcance from the channeling of human ﬂows: most especially labor migrants, dis-
placed persons and refugees. Fourthly, border towns grew up at speciﬁc nodes along roads
and railways at the points where these crossed colonial and post-colonial borders. This list,
which is not exhaustive, captures cognate phenomena that have been identiﬁed right
across the continent. But it would be difﬁcult to sustain a typology of border towns on
the basis of these distinctions, for the simple reason that in concrete instances the
dynamics have been interwoven in complex ways. Hence, as we have indicated, the found-
ing of administrative centers often stimulated trade in settlements located across the bor-
derline. Again, in recent times displaced peoples and migrants have often converged on
administrative centers because of the greater personal security that these afford. Some
border towns embody more of one dynamic than another. This is also true of towns
that face each other across the line: for example, a city like N’djaména has grown by
virtue of its role as the capital, while Kousseri’s more modest expansion is almost entirely
a consequence of the possibilities for trade that its neighbor presents. But their emergence
as closely related settlements has to be understood in terms of the interplay between the
dynamics in question which have shaped each other’s trajectories as cities and towns.
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Twin Towns on the Uganda-Kenya Border: Busia, Malaba, Lwakhakha
Having sketched out some of the dynamics that have helped to shape twin cities and towns
across Africa, we turn now to two regional case-studies and some speciﬁc cases within
them. The ﬁrst case-study is from East Africa, and focuses on twin towns along the
Uganda-Kenya border. In neither country is the capital city located close to the inter-
national border, even if Kampala is situated on the edge of Lake Victoria. The southern
Uganda-Kenya borderlands are demographically dense, but the variant of peripheral
urbanism that has emerged here is one on which border towns have remained relatively
small: indeed, the towns in question do not make the top ten in either country.10 Never-
theless, they have played an important role within regional commercial ﬂows and national
governance structures. The three pairings we will consider—Busia, Malaba and Lwakha-
kha—share the fact that they are the approved border posts on the southern border
between Uganda and Kenya. All the commercial trafﬁc that passes from Kenya through
Uganda to Rwanda, South Sudan and the DRC transits through these three towns. The
ﬁrst two are classic examples of “connected” cities/towns (Buursink 2001, 8) whose for-
tunes have been transformed by infrastructural investments.
This case-study provides a good illustration of the way in which colonial administrative
logics played themselves out. The border was settled between Uganda and Kenya in 1902.
Although British administrators governed both colonies, they did not always see eye to
eye. The Ugandan administration and the Bagisu people, who wished to be administered
together with the related Babukusu people in Kenya, hoped to one day shift the border
back to the Nzoia river where it had once been located.11 But unlike on the northern
section of the border, where the line was actually re-drawn to conform to an ethnic bound-
ary between the Karamoja and the Turkana, the southern border became fully
entrenched.12 The contours of the border were shaped by the existence of pre-colonial
market towns and the presence of rivers that could be used to deﬁne the international
boundary. Situated between Lake Victoria and Mount Elgon, Busia was the perfect
location for the development of a market, because producers from different ecological
zones—ﬁshermen from the Lake Victoria and farmers from the surrounding area—
could gather there to exchange their products. Such an intermediary position, enhanced
by the ﬂat landscape, was convenient also for the establishment of a colonial border. By
contrast, Malaba and Lwakhakha further to the north were each located on two sides of
a river that constituted the border. Indeed, Malaba derived its very name from the river.
The practical effect of the border was felt locally only a few decades later, particularly
with the construction of border posts in the 1930s. Following a familiar pattern, the
Ugandan administration responded to a Kenyan decision to establish posts on their
side of the line by following suit (UNA, Entebbe, Provincial Papers Box 6, N122,
“Annual Report by the Provincial Commissioner of the Eastern Province for the Year
1931”). Administrative reforms completely changed the organization of power in the
region, imposing a modiﬁcation of the Buganda system on the Uganda side of the
border that was different to what prevailed in Kenya.13 In addition, the trajectory of the
towns was inﬂuenced by larger administrative processes. The proximity of Malaba-
Uganda to Tororo meant that the former developed in the shadow of the larger and
more important district capital. This affected its growth, even if its central role was guar-
anteed by the presence of the border itself. Lwakhakha was favored by its northern
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position close to Mount Elgon. But at the same time its remoteness, and the difﬁculty of
the terrain, negatively affected the development of its infrastructure. Indeed this has
remained the main obstacle to its development to this day.14 Despite diverging priorities
between the regimes on the two sides of the border, the region became mutually economi-
cally dependent through a common communication system for East Africa, arising out of
the construction of the Uganda Railway. The result was the creation of new towns and
communities, which reﬂected the fact the borders not only divided some people who
were already there (UNA 1959), but also attracted new settlers. This served to create
much more mobile and heterogeneous communities. In addition, the railway made the
margins central to the thinking of the states concerned. For Uganda especially, Kenya pro-
vided the main, and at times the single, gateway to the external world. Here, we can
witness the ways in which administrative and economic logics fed off one another.
In the decades after independence, the trajectory of the border towns was profoundly
inﬂuenced by the interplay between political and economic processes. The two Busias
became the largest and the least peripheral of the three towns considered. They were
centers of trade, where a single community predominated.15 Busia-Uganda thrived
thanks to a trade in ﬁsh from Lake Victoria,16 and to some services that were not
present on the other side of the line, such as the bus park and the existence of a formal
market.17 Generally the twin towns evolved in parallel. After independence, the business
of Busia-Uganda began to thrive and the town, which had been very small, started to show
some signs of expansion. However, it developed at a slower pace than its Kenyan sibling,
which derived some of its stimulus from the more rapid commercial development of
western Kenya. In general, the ﬂow of population across the border was not impeded,
and both towns tended to beneﬁt from a high level of mobility (Figure 1).
Figure 1. Uganda/Kenya Border.
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The turning point was the military coup that brought Idi Amin to power in Uganda in
1971. The economic collapse that followed the pursuit of a series of disastrous policies,
including the expulsion of the Asians, led to the emergence of magendo (Prunier
1983)—a term that covered a range of activity from engagement in the black market to
smuggling. In Amin’s time, the borderland was characterized by a paradox: because of
the paralysis of the Ugandan economy, some unofﬁcial activities ﬂourished, most
notably the smuggling of coffee (dubbed the “black gold”). This brought some wealth to
the border towns, which served as the transit points for the contraband trade with
Kenya (Wekesa 2010). But at the same time, an attempt by the regime to crack down
on smuggling, coupled with Amin’s revival of the “old” border dispute with Kenya,
brought with it a military presence and hence greater risks to cross-border traders.18
Although some proﬁted—and in a sense the risks were proportional to the economic
rents—this was not really reﬂected in the built environment because to invest in pro-
perty risked attracting unwelcome attention. The wisest thing to do was to trade with
Busia-Uganda and invest in Busia-Kenya. It is only in the past few decades that
Busia-Uganda has started manifesting the outward signs of development, and even
more recently that it has exhibited a demographic growth comparable to that in Kenya.
It now boasts many double-storey buildings, well-stocked stores and services beﬁtting a
provincial center.19 These new buildings are a consequence of the increased presence of
both traders and government employees. The apparently larger and more developed
town of Busia-Kenya has beneﬁted from the same conjuncture between its centrality in
commerce and its own role as an administrative center. It boasts many more stores and
an impressive multi-storey hotel that towers over the border crossing.20
Although local government structures have been important for the demographic
growth and spatial layout of these border towns, the central bureaucracy has also estab-
lished a more visible presence in response to the increased ﬂows of both people and
goods. In the early 1990s, immigration statistics reveal that far more people ofﬁcially
arrived and left Uganda through the Busia and Malaba border crossings than through
the national airport in Entebbe (Table 2). The presence of the Revenue Authorities—
which embrace Customs, and Immigration, to mention only the frontline state agencies
—have played no small part in the expansion of the Busia and Malaba twin towns. By con-
trast, the two settlements called Lwakhakha still feel like small outposts.
At the present time, the importance of these border towns is being considerably
enhanced as a consequence of the regional integration agenda pursued by the East
African Community (EAC). Alongside the harmonization of Customs and Immigration,
substantial investments are being channeled into connective infrastructure, including new
road networks and One-Stop Border Posts (OSBPs). This is having a visible impact on the
twin towns of Busia and Malaba, albeit in different ways. The two towns of Busia are the
most lively, beneﬁting from the ﬂat terrain and favorable location—even if there is surely
more business on the Kenya side. The trafﬁc in Busia is mainly in the form of “wet” goods,
and in particular petroleum, thanks to the relative proximity of Kisumu, one of the hubs
for the oil trade in Kenya. A striking difference with Malaba is the much greater number of
small-scale smugglers in Busia. Here, a prominent role is played by disabled traders
(Ingstad andWhyte 2007, 290), a phenomenon that became more prevalent during Muse-
veni’s time.21 Despite its smaller size, Malaba-Uganda is the headquarters responsible for
six Customs sections—that is, along the length of the Eastern border.22 Its strategic
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position arises from its proximity to the Northern corridor,23 which brings goods to South
Sudan, a country that is almost entirely dependent on the Uganda route for its trade.
Trafﬁc in Malaba is mainly in the form of “dry” goods,24 taking some of the pressure
off Busia. Its advantage derives from the presence of the railway, which carries trade
goods rather than people. The construction of OSBPs at Busia and Malaba25 further
reinforces their importance as focal points for the performance of state- and inter-state
regulation. In Malaba, a major infrastructural bottleneck is presented by the bridge
across the river, which was built during colonial times and which cannot handle more
than a single vehicle at a time. However, a new bridge is under construction, and there
has been some success in facilitating the passage of goods and people through this
border post. It is anticipated that more trafﬁc will pass through Malaba in the future,
bringing further business to the towns of the same name that face each other across the
river.
To sum up, several points emerge from the Uganda-Kenya case-study. The ﬁrst is that
the creation of a colonial border, which was far from a random choice, was accompanied
by the formation of twin towns that were designed to regulate the ﬂow of people, cattle and
goods. These were administrative imperatives, but it is important to recognize that the cre-
ation of the border imparted an enhanced signiﬁcance to settlements that were inserted
into much older systems of trade. Secondly, their signiﬁcant demographic expansion
really began with the development of the contraband economy in the 1970s. This was
initially more apparent on the Kenya side of the line where there was greater physical
security and a more buoyant local economy. Despite the ﬂourishing cross-border trade,
endemic insecurity on the Ugandan side tended to discourage entrepreneurs from invest-
ing in property in somewhere like Busia-Uganda. Census data would suggest that it is only
recently that Busia-Uganda has demographically caught up with, and possibly overtaken,
its twin on the other side of the line. Thirdly, the regional integration initiatives being
pursued by the EAC have singled out these border towns as the strategic nodes that
will link larger regional economies. The connective infrastructure of rail, road and
OSBPs is drawing in more traders, but also enhancing the local presence of the state.
The built environment in Busia and Malaba is being visibly transformed in the process.
If Lwakhakha is upgraded, to better handle the trafﬁc to South Sudan, its own fortunes
may be transformed in the future—as indeed may those of Bibia (northern Uganda)
and Nimule (South Sudan) where another OSBP is envisaged.
Twin Towns on the Ghana-Togo Border
Our second case-study is drawn from the Ghana-Togo border in West Africa. Peripheral
urbanism has manifested itself at different scales and in a somewhat different manner to
the case we have just considered. First of all, as we have already mentioned, this region
provides an example of a capital city, Lomé, that is located on an international border,
where it almost merges with its much smaller Ghanaian neighbor of Aﬂao. Secondly,
there are a number of other closely related towns strung along this border, even if
the phenomenon of towns bearing the same names is less common than in East Africa.
Some towns have derived their importance from serving as ofﬁcial border posts,
but historically most of the commercial trafﬁc has tended to pass through the single
Lomé-Aﬂao crossing.
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As in the case of East Africa, colonial administrative and ﬁscal logics played a funda-
mental role in shaping the demography of the borderlands. The extension eastwards of
the Gold Coast Colony in 1874 was motivated by a British desire to capture and tax the
trade traveling southwards along the Volta River valley. Lomé existed as a series of
small ﬁshing villages, whereas Aﬂao was a coastal port that had been familiar to Atlantic
traders in the 18th century. Signiﬁcantly, Lomé was founded by a motley collection of
European and African traders seeking to evade Gold Customs duties. This meant that
the town was ethnically highly diverse from the start, a pattern that was reinforced by
virtue of in-migration in the colonial period (Marguerat 1992). Ultimately, it was admin-
istrative logics that proved to be decisive in shaping its growth as a city. In 1897, the
Germans transferred their capital from Anécho to Lomé. The city was constructed accord-
ing to a grid pattern, with a clear differentiation between an administrative quarter and the
commercial that pre-dated the arrival of the Germans (Gervais-Lambony 2012, 46–8).26
By contrast, Aﬂao expanded in a more organic fashion. The contrast between the
planned capital and the unplanned border town is strikingly reﬂected in satellite maps
today. Securing the border was an immediate imperative for both the British and the
German authorities. Establishing Customs posts was complicated along the coastal
strip, which is broken up by lagoons, but it was considerably easier further north where
the Volta River itself constituted the border.27
The trajectory of Lomé as a city was shaped not just by its role as the capital city, but as
importantly by the development of its port facilities. From Lomé, the Germans con-
structed three railways to each of the main cash-crop-producing zones in the interior.
Cocoa, palm products and cotton were shipped out from the wharf at Lomé, which was
completed in 1904, while imported goods traveled the other way. After the First World
War, France laid claim to Lomé, which had been under British occupation from 1914,
on the basis that it provided the only suitable port facilities along the coastline (Nugent
2002, 31). In 1921, the capital and railways were formally conferred upon France,
which proceeded to build a new wharf and to re-plan parts of the city. Further north,
the British retained a segment of German territory as British Southern Togoland, which
required the demarcation of a new borderline east of the Volta. In some cases, closely-
related settlements were partitioned in the process. Agotime provides the most obvious
instance thereof. What had once been a polity of some regional signiﬁcance in the 18th
and 19th centuries was divided into two unequal halves. Kpetoe, the capital was placed
in British Togoland, while the majority of the Agotime towns were allocated to French
Togoland.
The subsequent history of the border was shaped by two realities: the ﬁrst was that
because the Gold Coast did not levy direct taxes its import duties were generally higher;
and the second was that the port of Lomé was considerably closer to the eastern districts
of the Gold Coast and British Togoland than its own ports were. British commercial ﬁrms
therefore chose to channel much of their trade through Lomé. In addition, there was a sub-
stantial contraband trade in goods that were more expensive in the Gold Coast—especially
Dutch gin, which provided a major source of revenue for the British. Border populations
typically purchased the goods that had already cleared Customs in Lomé, and then head-
loaded them across the border into British territory. Hence, the importance of Kpetoe
market was enhanced by the transit of consumer goods through Assahoun in French ter-
ritory. Finally, although the fate of Lomé was bound up with the re-export trade, it was also
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the point of departure for migrant workers who made their way to Accra, where the
options for paid employment were considerably greater. The combined importance of
trade and migration to the Gold Coast meant that the English language enjoyed consider-
able currency in Lomé. Here again, we can gain some sense of the ways in which admin-
istrative logics were intertwined with other dynamics related to trade and migration.
As in the case of East Africa, the independence years were pivotal in the development of
border towns. Whereas the regime of Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana embraced a policy of
state-led industrialization, its counterpart in Togo preferred to pursue an entrepôt strategy
based on the steady ﬂow of goods through the port at Lomé. The subsequent completion of
a deep-water port in 1968 conferred an additional advantage on Lomé. The failure of
Nkrumah’s socialist program culminated in the imposition of increasingly stringent
import licensing and exchange controls in the 1960s. Under military rule in the 1970s,
the crisis deepened further as Ghana’s factories labored under severe shortages of raw
materials and spare parts. The lack of consumer goods created the opportunities for
traders in the border zone who typically purchased them in Lomé, transported them by
lorry to the border, ofﬂoaded and headloaded them into Ghana, where they were re-
loaded onto trucks on the other side. This relay system depended on the existence of
close relations between border populations on either side of the line who worked together
to frustrate anti-smuggling operations by the Ghanaian authorities. In addition, some
settlements were able to exploit their particular location. In Agotime, the tiny village of
Wodome is located on either side of the road that separates Ghana from Togo. At the
height of Ghana’s crisis, it became a hive of commercial activity as Ghanaians traveled
from as far aﬁeld as Kumasi to purchase goods and to drink beer on the Togo side of
the road. But once the shortages ended, Wodome returned to being a village of no
great signiﬁcance. A crumbling police station on the Togolese side of the road is the
remaining visual reminder of a time when Wodome boomed (Figure 2).
The Lomé free port was notionally intended to facilitate the economic links with the
landlocked Sahelian states, but this barely disguised the reality that much of what was
imported was really intended for Ghana (Bost 2007). As with Benin in relation to
Nigeria, becoming a successful entrepôt state entailed capitalizing on the idiosyncracies
of economic policy next door (Igue and Soule 1992; Golub 2012).28 But it was also part
of what enabled the Eyadéma regime, which was always considered by southern Togolese
to have usurped power, to establish a modicum of compliance amongst the youth of the
capital (and the south more generally) by allowing free rein to the contraband trade. The
cloth market in Lomé, which was run entirely by female traders, was inserted into a truly
global chain of connectivity (Cordonnier 1987). The cloth was imported from Europe, sold
at the market and then redistributed throughout the sub-region. Given the travails of
Ghana’s own textile factories, much of it was destined for the latter market. Many
traders in Lomé either sold cloth directly into Ghana or acted as intermediaries for
traders further along the chain. Although the fact that Lomé was the capital was almost
bound to lead to some urban growth, it was the economic underpinnings of that
growth that mostly explain why it served as a magnet for the rest of the country.
This brings us to some particularities of the twin city/town phenomenon along the
Ghana-Togo border. Based on a recent re-calculation of urban growth ﬁgures for West
Africa, Olivier Walther concludes that border market towns are demographically “indis-
tinguishable from other population centers based on a strictly demographic criterion”
JOURNAL OF BORDERLANDS STUDIES 549
(Walther 2014a, 160). The main exception is along the coastal strip that runs from Lagos
through Lomé/Aﬂao to south-eastern Ghana, where the acceleration of urban agglomera-
tion has been closely associated with the elaboration of regional trade networks. The ﬁve-
fold expansion of Lomé in the two decades between 1960 and 1980 undoubtedly reﬂected
the overwhelming importance of cross-border trade. Although some formal employment
was created around the industrial zone from the 1990s, Lomé became a magnet for people
who carved out a living in the informal sector. Merchants, small-scale traders, currency
changers, head porters, drivers, bar and storekeepers came to depend on the border for
their livelihoods and accumulation strategies. In the last two decades, the population of
Lomé has doubled again, reaching an estimated 1.5 million inhabitants. The same
pattern of rapid and sustained growth is apparent in Aﬂao. The population of what was
once a small town grew by 342% between 1970 and 2000 at a time when the population
of Ghana as a whole expanded at a rate of 221%. In fact, Aﬂao grew faster than metropo-
litan Accra (266%) and Kumasi (338%) over the same time period. This almost certainly
reﬂects the movement into Aﬂao of people who sought to make a living from working the
border. Traders in Aﬂao have always enjoyed close kin relations with their counterparts in
Lomé. The manner in which Aﬂao has expanded in recent times partly reﬂects the pres-
ence of a large array of state actors, given that is Ghana’s most strategic border crossing.
But it is also a consequence of the fact that, following the political turmoil in Togo in the
1990s, Lomé came to be regarded as an unsafe place to live. Hence many chose to reside in
Aﬂao while conducting business in Lomé. The destinies of the two conurbations continue,
therefore, to be thoroughly intertwined.
However, as one moves inland a different picture emerges that lends support to
Walther’s observation. Strung out along the border, there are small towns that mostly
pre-date the demarcation of the border in the mid-1920s. These are home to closely
Figure 2. Ghana/Togo Border.
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related peoples who have intermarried, traded and shared other social relations even when
the borders have been formally closed. Some of these towns have developed on the basis of
being designated as border posts through which important roads have been located. Along
the Togoland hills, such posts have been located at the most accessible crossing points.
Examples would be the twin towns of Wli-Afegame (Ghana) and Yikpa-Dzigbe (Togo),
or Leklebi-Dafo (Ghana) and Tomegbe (Togo). But in many cases, the border villages
remained very small, with the real towns being set back from the border. The pattern is
somewhat different on the two sides of the line. Because the main trunk road from
Aﬂao to Ho skirts the border, many Ghanaian towns are located on or very close to the
line: examples would be Honuta, Shia and Nyive. But in Togo, the main trunk road
from Lomé to Kpalimé is located at some distance from the border, with the result that
the main towns tend to be set back as well. Nevertheless, the fates of many such towns
have often been closely intertwined. Dzodze (Ghana) and Noepé (Togo), with an esti-
mated population of 31,727 and 9,414, respectively in 2010, can reasonably be regarded
as twin towns because of their close economic and social relationship. The border post
in Ghana is located at Akanu, a tiny village to the south of Dzodze, whereas Noepé
itself is set back by a couple of kilometers. But since the 1970s, there has been a vibrant
trade in contraband goods linking Noepé and Dzodze. The same would be true of the
relationship between Kpedze (Ghana) and Kpadafé (Togo). In partitioned Agotime,
Kpetoe (Ghana) continues to host an important market, which sucks in trade from
towns on both sides of the border. At the border itself, Batome Junction is a small
village in Ghana whose signiﬁcance derives from being designated as an ofﬁcial border
crossing, while a few kilometers into Togo the village of Batoumé is another small settle-
ment that was founded by people from Kpetoe in the 19th century. The nearest substantive
(non-Agotime) town to Kpetoe is Assahoun, which is located some 15 km from the actual
border. But as with Noepé and Dzodze, the commercial towns of Kpetoe and Assahoun
have been closely linked through trade. Away from the coast, therefore, the dominant
pattern is a proliferation of towns that are plugged into the border economy rather
than a concentration of population in a few trading centers. This partly reﬂects the fact
that the trade at the border has tended to reside in the hands of those who construe them-
selves as the indigenes. The relay system arose in part because of the reluctance of border
populations to permit merchants from outside to dominate local trade.
Finally, as in the East African case, the regional integration initiatives of the Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) are likely to have an impact on border
towns that stand to beneﬁt from the redirection of trade and a heightened administrative
presence. The Abidjan-Lagos trade corridor, which is by far the most important within the
West African sub-region, passes through Lomé/Aﬂao. Imports entering Lomé and
Cotonou reach Burkina Faso and neighboring Sahelian states by passing through
Ghana. Although many smaller vehicles currently travel through other designated
border crossings, the heavy-goods trafﬁc has thus far been concentrated on Lomé/Aﬂao.
This pattern is expected to change in the coming years. The Customs posts in Ghana
have revenue targets to meet and there is already a policy of redirecting some of the
trafﬁc towards smaller posts like Kpoglo. Some of the traders who import Chinese
goods from Lomé also prefer to use posts like Batome Junction because of the shorter
waiting times.29 But most importantly, a joint OSBP was opened at Noepé at the end of
2014, with the expectation that more of the heavy-goods trafﬁc will take this alternative
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route. If this funneling of regional trade has the intended effects, it is likely that Dzodze
and Noepé will attract many ancillary services and experience accelerated growth in the
coming years.30
Conclusion
In this article, we have sought to make a number of points about the trajectory of twin
towns and cities in Africa. The ﬁrst is that history matters. The choices that were made
by colonial regimes about where they placed their capitals, where they constructed their
roads, railways and ports, and where they established border posts had enduring conse-
quences. But whether, and in what speciﬁc ways, border towns came into existence also
owed a great deal to the pre-existing political and economic landscape. After independence,
the divergent economic policies adopted by African governments similarly had an impor-
tant bearing on the evolution of patterns of cross-border trade and urban development. The
second main point is that Africa reveals markedly different variants on the phenomenon of
twin cities/towns. At one end of the spectrum is the vast conurbation of Kinshasa/Brazza-
ville, while at the other end lies the pairing of small settlements like Batome Junction and
Batoumé on the Ghana-Togo border. In between are very many smaller towns—of which
Busia-Uganda/Busia-Kenya and Dzodze/Noepé are prime examples—which have grown in
tandem with one another. Towns like Busia-Uganda and Kpetoe have found themselves at
the center of cross-border trade, but have experienced sluggish population growth for
periods of time. This would suggest that both the organization of the trade and issues of
security have also played a mediating role. A third point is that while administrative
logics and trade have been the main drivers in the development of twin cities/towns, it is
difﬁcult to disentangle these from migratory ﬂows. Again, the ﬂight of populations from
insecurity has also played a signiﬁcant role in the Great Lakes region and in West-
Central Africa. Fourthly, although border towns in Africa have grown considerably since
the 1960s, and some have experienced periods of boom, this has typically happened
unevenly on two sides of a given border. But, by contrast with the United States/Mexico
border, it is difﬁculty to locate a uniform pattern. Whereas on the Kenya/Uganda
border, the towns located in the country with the stronger economy have expanded
faster, this pattern is reversed on the DRC/Rwanda border. The importance of informal
border trade does, however, share some characteristics with the US/Mexico case (Staudt
1998). There is also some similarity between the ways in which aspiring migrants from
Mexico converge on trampoline towns at the border, and the way in which displaced popu-
lations in Africa become lodged in border spaces. In consequence, none of these points
would suggest that there is a need to invent a different typology to cover African manifes-
tations of the twin town phenomenon: it is true that states have had a more limited capacity
to mold border spaces, that there is a very broad spectrum of size, and that duplicated cities/
towns are the norm, but there is nothing qualitatively different in any of this. This bodes
well for future efforts at cross-regional comparison.
Endnotes
1. In West Africa, there are a couple of designated trans-boundary development corridors
where ofﬁcials are supposed to work with one another. These are the Sikasso-Korhogo-
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Bobo Dioulasso corridor which straddles Mali, Côte d’Ivoire, and Burkina Faso; and the
Maradi-Katsina-Kano corridor between Niger and Nigeria. But these initiatives remain
very much incipient. See the contributions to Enda Diapol (2007).
2. However, Bennaﬂa (2002, 87) notes that it was Mbaiboum, on the Cameroun border to the
west, which became Bangui’s source of consumer goods originating from Nigeria and
Cameroun.
3. In the ﬁrst two cases, the asymmetries were very striking whereas the towns on the South
African side of the border were relatively large in relation to Maseru.
4. In the 1970s, some 40% of the coffee crop was smuggled out of Zaire, with Kivu featuring
especially prominently in the illicit trade.
5. The most recent population estimates for Birni N’Konni was 63,000 and Illela 32,000.
6. http://www.citypopulation.de/Zambia-Cities.html
7. http://www.trademarksa.org/news/kasumbalesa-border-revenue-50. There seem to be no
reliable population estimates for Kasumbalesa, but Congolese sources claim a population
of around 100,000 for the commune as a whole. Satellite maps would tend to conﬁrm that
it is signiﬁcantly bigger than Chililabombwe http://acpcongo.com/acp/cite-de-kasumbalesa-
du-statut-de-cite-a-celui-de-commune-rurale/
8. At various points, the Rwandan army was ﬁghting inside Rwanda against the Mayi-Mayi.
9. http://www.populationdata.net/index2.php?option=pays&pid=183&nom=rwanda
10. Population data for the two sides are difﬁcult to compare. We have access to the (provisional)
2014 Uganda Census data, but only 2009 data for the Kenyan side. For the two Busias and the
two Malabas these are contained in Table 1 . The Kenyan government did not publish ﬁgures
for Lwakhakha, while Lwakhakha-Uganda town council has a total of 9,061 inhabitants.
Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (August 2010); Uganda Bureau of Statistics (November
2014).
11. The Bagisu lived in the Mbale area in the Eastern Province of Uganda. Uganda National
Archive [UNA] (1959).
12. The aim was to reduce conﬂict associated with cattle raiding. UNA (1958–60).
13. Most of the African agents and chiefs used in the region were Baganda, a factor that reshaped
Eastern politics, society and economic activities, through the imposition of the Buganda’s
administrative system; UNA (1938). In Western Kenya, the British attempted to impose
chiefs from the more centralized Wanga sub-group on the closely related peoples of Kavir-
ondo (MacArthur 2016, 46–7).
14. Poor infrastructure, particularly roads condition, determined the ban over major trafﬁc of
goods through Lwakhakha, evidently strongly inﬂuencing its development; interview with
Nelson Mugisha – Uganda Revenue Authority [URA], Lwakhakha, August 30, 2014.
15. In Busia’s area the main ethnic group is the Samia, even if with different variation of the
language on the two sides of the border. Interview with Odeke Nicodemus, local retailer,
Busia-Uganda August 22, 2014.
16. Interview with Odeke Nicodemus, Busia-Uganda, August 22, 2014.
17. Interview with Fabian Okumu, manager of Maryland Inn, Busia-Uganda, August 24, 2014.
18. The army had orders to shoot the smugglers on the spot. Interview with Odeke Nicodemus,
Busia-Uganda, August 22, 2014.
19. The ofﬁcial statistics for population are possibly misleading because the Ugandan ﬁgures
would appear to include a larger area than the town proper. The ﬂuctuating and unsecure
trajectory of Busia-Uganda is mirrored in its administrative history: originally part of the Dis-
trict of Tororo, Busia gained full District status in 1976, only to be lowered to a sub-District in
1979, before being promoted again into District in July 1997. Interview with Odeke Nicode-
mus, Busia-Uganda, August 22, 2014. UBOS, Busia District 2009; http://www.ubos.org/
onlineﬁles/uploads/ubos/2009_HLG_%20Abstract_printed/Busia%20District.pdf
20. Hotel Itoya would not be out of place in any capital city.
21. Interview with Odeke Nicodemus, Busia-Uganda, August 22, 2014.
22. Interview with Geoffrey Balamaga, regional manager Eastern Customs – URA, Malaba-
Uganda, August 28, 2014.
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23. Interview with Elizabeth Opondo, Principal revenue ofﬁcer at enforcement and security
section, KRA [Kenya Revenue Authority], Malaba-Kenya, August 29, 2014.
24. Interview with Geoffrey Balamaga, Malaba-Uganda, August 28, 2014.
25. Malaba’s OSBP started working on January 2015; email to Isabella Soi from Masaba Rogers,
Malaba-Uganda, March 4, 2015.
26. By the end of the German period, the current layout was essentially complete (Marguerat
1992, 25).
27. In this case what was unusual is that both banks of the Volta River were claimed by the Gold
Coast Colony.
28. The other such country was Benin.
29. These comments are based on informal discussions with Ghana Customs ofﬁcials at Kpoglo
and Batome Junction in October 2014.
30. This is apparent already in the proliferation of new hotels in Dzodze. Discussion with Noel
Kossonou, Afua Eshun, Bright Senam Gowonu, Dela Bani of Borderless Alliance at head
ofﬁce, Accra-Osu, Ghana, October 28, 2014.
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